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REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ALLISSA BREEANNA DUNLAP, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43220
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-6699
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alissa Breeanna Dunlap pleaded guilty to one
count of grand theft. The district court imposed a sentence of eight years, with two
years fixed. On appeal, Ms. Dunlap asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed the sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In August of 2014, Ms. Dunlap pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft; she
admitted that she was working as a housekeeper when she stole several rings that were
valued at over $1,000. (Tr. 8/22/14, p.13, L.5 – p.14, L.11.) Ms. Dunlap committed the
crime in the fall of 2012. (Tr. 8/22/14, p.13, Ls.5-16.) She was on probation at the time
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as a result of a prior conviction in Canyon County.
Presentence Report1 (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)

(Tr. 4/24/15, p.28, Ls.16-19;

Ms. Dunlap violated the terms of her

probation by committing this offense, and the Canyon County district court revoked her
probation but retained jurisdiction. (Tr. 8/22/14, p.6, Ls.3-7; 4/24/15, p.28, Ls.15-23.)
After successfully completing a Rider program, the Canyon County district court placed
her on probation again in August of 2013. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.28, Ls.23-24.)
In February of 2014, the Ada County prosecutor filed an information charging
Ms. Dunlap with the one count of grand theft.

(R., pp.38-39.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Ms. Dunlap pleaded guilty. (Tr. 8/22/14, p.13, Ls.5-16.) In exchange, the
State agreed to recommend that the district court impose a ten-year sentence, with two
years fixed, which would run concurrent to the Canyon County sentence. (Tr. 8/22/14,
p.5, Ls.15-19.) The State also indicated that it would be willing to recommend a lower
sentence if Ms. Dunlap could pay restitution to the victim by the time of sentencing.
(Tr. 8/22/14, p.7, Ls.1-10.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose
the ten-year sentence because, among other things, Ms. Dunlap had not paid the
restitution and had committed two misdemeanors after the entry of plea hearing in this
case. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.20, L.24 – p.23, L.15.) Citing Ms. Dunlap’s mental health issues,
and the fact that the Canyon County district court had placed Ms. Dunlap on probation

All references to the PSI refer to the 142-page electronic document. The Presentence
Report was prepared for sentencing in the Canyon County case – CR 2011- 23044, and
the parties agreed that a new PSI did not need to be prepared for this case.
(Tr. 8/22/14, p.6, Ls.8-11, p.16, Ls.9-25.) However, a recent mental health assessment
prepared for the Canyon County case is attached to the old report along with police
reports, and other documents relevant to this case.
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and ordered that she participate in Mental Health Court, Ms. Dunlap’s counsel
requested that the district court place Ms. Dunlap on probation to run concurrent with
her probation in Canyon County, so that she could get mental health treatment and pay
the restitution. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.28, L.15 – p.34, L.34.) The district court imposed a
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, and ordered that Ms. Dunlap pay restitution.
(Tr. 4/24/15, p.36, Ls.11-16; R., pp.71-73.) Ms. Dunlap then filed a Notice of Appeal
that was timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.76-77.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, following Ms. Dunlap’s plea of guilty to grand theft?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following Ms. Dunlap’s Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft
Based on the facts of this case, Ms. Dunlap’s sentence of eight years, with two
years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent examination of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).

Unless it appears that confinement was
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necessary “to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case,” a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982). Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, “under any reasonable view of the
facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are multiple mitigating factors that show why Ms. Dunlap’s sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First, she has struggled with severe
mental health problems from a very young age. Indeed, she had to be hospitalized
three times for suicide attempts before she was 20 years old, and she explained that
she was first diagnosed with a bipolar disorder when she was only 8 and PTSD when
she was only 10. (PSI, p.81.) These issues have not abated over time as her most
recent mental health assessment indicated that she still suffers from PTSD and a
bipolar

disorder.

(PSI,

p.85.)

Her

mental

health

assessor

said

that

Ms. Dunlap gave “the overall impression of a mood-disordered, traumatized and
historically impulsive/substance-affected, yet

surprisingly cooperative,

polite and

intelligent/thoughtful young woman . . . .” (PSI, p.84.) The assessor went on to note
that Ms. Dunlap presented as “legitimately dysthymic/depressed” with a “personal
psychiatric hospitalization history,” and a “long family history of mood-disorder free from
drug complication.”

(PSI, p.84.)

Based on these findings, and the assessor’s

conclusion that, despite her problems, Ms. Dunlap was “a reliable enough historian with
good insight,” the assessor said that she was “a good candidate for Mental Health
Court.” (PSI, p.84.)
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The onset of severe mental health problems at such an early age was clearly
related to the fact that Ms. Dunlap was sexually and physically abused as a child. (PSI,
p.7.) She explained that her parents divorced when she was a toddler, and her father
raised her until she was 9 years old. (PSI, p.7.) She said that her father was an
alcoholic who physically abused her. (PSI, p.7.) She also said that she was sexually
abused by her father and his friends. (PSI, p.7.)
Not surprisingly, this sort of abuse led to mental health issues, problems in
school, delinquent behavior, and finally drug and alcohol abuse. (See PSI, pp.9, 82.)
She was suspended from school when she was in the ninth grade for drinking a bottle of
tequila, and she was later expelled because she started a fire at school. (PSI, p.9.)
She started using methamphetamine when she was 22, and was ultimately diagnosed
with amphetamine dependence. (PSI, pp.82, 85.) Idaho courts recognize that mental
health problems, an abusive childhood, and substance abuse are all mitigating factors
to be considered at sentencing. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994); State v.
Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
A defendant’s family support is also a long-recognized mitigating factor. State v.
Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991). And, despite her problems, Ms. Dunlap still
enjoys the support of her family. Several friends and family members wrote letters on
her behalf in June of 2013 just prior to her Rider review hearing. (PSI, pp.127–132.)
Her sister-in-law—who offered to let Ms. Dunlap live with her after she was released—
wrote that she had spoken with her on a weekly basis during the Rider and had “noticed
a huge change in her” as the program progressed. (PSI, p.129.) She also said that
Ms. Dunlap told her how much she appreciated the opportunity to engage in the
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program. (PSI, p.129.) Ms. Dunlap’s grandmother wrote that Ms. Dunlap had always
been a “hard worker with a kind heart,” and that she felt the Rider classes had “taught
her many things she did not know” and seemed to “encourage her for the future.” (PSI,
p.132.)
Indeed, as her counsel pointed out at the sentencing hearing, because the theft
occurred prior to the Rider, he believed that “the Rider had addressed what got her into
trouble.”

(Tr. 4/24/15, p.29, Ls.1-5.)

Evidently, the Canyon County district court

believed the same to be true as the district court decided probation with a mental health
program was the best option for Ms. Dunlap, even in light of the fact that Ms. Dunlap
had committed this offense. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.29, L.23 – p.30, L.10.)
This decision was likely based in part on the Addendum to the Presentence
Investigation (attached to the PSI) prepared at the end of the Rider. That document not
only contained positive comments about Ms. Dunlap’s progress from her supervisors,
but also many statements from Ms. Dunlap herself, which indicated that she had
improved a great deal and would likely continue to improve in a structured setting such
as Mental Health Court. (See PSI, pp.90-97.) For example, the APSI writer said that
Ms. Dunlap “made progress while in programming as evidence (sic) by her ability to be
accountable for her actions and confronting other’s behaviors when appropriate.
Ms. Dunlap has taken initiative to tutor her classmates and asks for help when she
needs assistance.”

(PSI, p.95.)

When asked to comment on her progress in the

program, Ms. Dunlap said that she was “proud to have completed the program with
dignity” and that she looked forward to being “an asset to the community rather than a
detriment.” (PSI, p.96.)
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Finally, Ms. Dunlap accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse for this
offense. At the sentencing hearing, she apologized to the district court and said that
she was “sincerely sorry” for what she did. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.35, L.5.) She said there was
“no justification or excuse” for her “horrible” actions. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.35, Ls.3-8.) She
also told the district court that she had been attending “substance abuse and support
group classes,” and she thought Mental Health Court would help her.
p.35, Ls.17-20.)

(Tr. 4/24/15,

A defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse is also

considered as mitigating information. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-95 (1982).
It is clear that, despite her strong progress on the Rider, Ms. Dunlap still needs
specialized mental health treatment, and would be a good candidate for Mental Health
Court. Nevertheless, the district court imposed her sentence in large part because
Ms. Dunlap had not begun to pay restitution. (Tr. 4/24/15, p.35, L.24 – 36, L.2.) Given
the wealth of mitigating information here, however, Ms. Dunlap’s sentence was
excessive because it was not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing outlined in
Toohill. Society would be protected if Ms. Dunlap was on probation and participated in
Mental Health Court because she would be under strict supervision. This would also
serve as a strong deterrent and allow her to find a job and start paying restitution. But
most importantly, it would give Ms. Dunlap an opportunity to engage in meaningful
therapy, to help her overcome her mental health issues and appropriately address and
process the tragic events of her youth. The district court failed to adequately consider
the mitigating information. Given the facts of this case, Ms. Dunlap’s prison sentence
was not necessary and was therefore unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.

7

CONCLUSION
Ms. Dunlap respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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